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Abstract
In this paper the criteria for the maximization of wealth in
agriculture are given and briefly analysed. These criteria are: (a)
whether or not property rights exist on land with legal and tenure
certainty, (b) whether the cost reward structure in ternalises costs and
benefits and (c) wheth r there is freedom and legal enforcement of
contracts· The degree to which Nigerian land tenure practices diverge
from the above optimal pattern is assessed in this paper ~ ith an analysis
of the economic consequences of communal tenure of land in Nigeria.
A. Introduction
Conditions under which a Tenure System Leads to Increases in Wealth
As Omotunde Evan George Johnson has shown, a land tenure
system facilitates increases in wealth when (a) property rights are
properly defined with legal and tenure certainty, and (b) there is
"freedom and legal enforcement of contracts when these do not have
physically harmful effects on outsiders for which the contracting parties
are not made to compensate."l
*Assoc. PeoL/Head, Department of, Finance/Insurance, I. M. T.•
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1 Johnson also included a third criterion: that the cost-reward
structure (the method of distributing wealth created from using land)
internalizes costs and benefits within the system. Said he. "if
within the land tenure system t he cost-reward structure internalizes
benefits and cost. each user of land is motivated to use land in space
and time so as to yield the maximum wealth from the land. For any
reduction in wealth as a result of his misallocate implies a pari passu
reduction in his wealth ........ ." But this last criterion is an outcome
of the land tenure system (hence (,1) and (b) above) for a
private properly right system leads to a concentract of benefits
and costs which would reduce th incidence of non-internalization of
externalities vis-a-visa communal system. See Omotunde Johnson,
49
7-264
~o INDIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMics
Further, Johnson has shown that the legal and tenure uncertainties
in African land tenure systems (specifically for Sierra Leone) militate
against optimal land use· In his analysis, the uncertainties derive from
the tendency for law enforcement agents to uphold customary law
against individual o,vnersbip, the non-speciocily of properly rights with
legal and tenure certainty, tbe unwritten nature of lilVls and contral;ts
and the inconsistency in administrative and judicial decisions.
These aho apply specifically to Nigeria. Because of the juxtaposi-
tion of customary IaN on statutory law in Nigeria, judicial decisions
must take into account the laws and cmtoms of the people concerned
in any outstanding disputes.
The consequence is that deci3ion3 of courts of law of the statutory
variety have aL ays upheld customary law principles wbil;h by and large
are opposed 10 alienation of land by sale. The hosts 0 restrictions
that surround alienatIon of land seem to red'Jce the volume of such
transactions. The cases that are available sho.v the} acqui~s:endE;: of these
law enforcement ai;.ents in these restrictions which inevitably lead
towa, ds a delay of the movement from communal ownership to private
property rights in land.
Uncertainty about property rights is a consequence of communal
tenure. Since, under communal tenure, land is u,vned by the group
comprising tbe community, it gives rise to uncertainty about the rights
of the individuals 10 particular allotments. Disputes often arise with
respect to the use or transfer of these lands creating additional
uncertainty.
The failure to keep written records about transactions on land is an
additional source of uncertainty. Disputes arise as to these transactions
and witnesses cannot b" relied on for complete recall of the exact
dealings that took place. These witnesses may die, the process of time
could weaken their recall, or they may be subje\:ted to bribes· Double
dealings on land thus are rendered common as a result of absence of
written documents.
"Economic Analysis. TheLegal Framework and Land Tenure Systems,"
Journal of Lc.w and Economics, 1972, pp. 260-?68.
Also Omotunde Johnson. "Economic Analysis and the Structure of
Land Rights in the Sierra Leone Provinces;' Doctoral Dissertation.
V.C.L.A., 1970, Ch. 3. In these, Johnson applies the arguments of
Coase, Demestz, Alchiall, and other property right theorists to African
land tenure systems.
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In their approach to custoillary La v, the British mad~ its enforce-
ment subjed 0 "natural justice, equity and good consci nce."2 This
ga ide discretionary pow<::r to IaN enforcement agem:ies and thdr
interpretations of customary law have not been marked with consistency
from one Ioca ity to the other.3
Thus in Odu V. A iboye, the plaintiff claimed damages for
defendant's unlawful reaping of the palm trees on the land granted to
defendant by plaintiff's father. Evidence was conclusi e that, in tbe
area concerned, only the n livI~s were allowed to reap palm trees and
that a gift of land do~s not carryall rights of unconditional exploitation
by the grantee. 1'h dt:fendant's claim t a right concurrent with that
of tbe plaintiff to reap palm trees failed.
In a similar cas;:, Ch ief Etim and others vs. Chief Eke and others
it was held both that grantee of land in Calabar were entitled to oocupy
a concurrent rigl t to cut palm nut with he grantors and that a stranger
o the community could b~ restrained by injunction at the suit of the
grantees from cutting palm nuts under a collateral ar rangement with the
donor grantors As J udge Martinda~e stated. the only right remaining
t the owner grantor as far as use of land is concerned is that of
reversion. should grantee deny title or abandon or attempt to alienate 4
These uncertainties increase transaction's cost and in consequence
should lower the value of land. Iso the higher the cost of establishing
ownership. the lONer is the demand price f a potential buyer, lessee or
center. In the equillibrium allo.::ation of land, there ..... ill be a divergence
between he marginal value of land in the original owner's use and its
marginal value in the r~nterDs use. Further, if the cost of establishing
certainty is pro':libitive, some lands would b~ unallocated to any use.
This could give rise to the phenomenon of "land surplus" and
2 Supra. Johnson (1972).
3 "From the stand point of economic use it matters not whi h way
the law. For once the law is established. All that is required this
certainty of la'N. For once the law is clearly established, landlords in
their decision making will take the facts into consideration when
d termining whether to accept a stram;er or not anCl what the nature of
the ensuing contracts will be." S e Johnson, op. cit., p- 264 (1972).
·1 Elias, Tasli Olawole, Nig rian Land LfHV and Custom. London:
Routledge and K. Paul Ltd. 1962 P. 185,
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"labour surplus" that is often used in describing the Nigerian
situation.5
B, Economic Consequences of Communal Tenure
With respect to Nigeria, the presence of communal tenure should
lead to the reduction of wealth for the farmer when compared to the
alternative of individual tenure (with fee-sLnple rights on land),
Further there should be a reduction of incentives for work especially
with respect to improving the productive capacity of the land.
The reduction of wealth for the farmer is a consequence of positive
transaction's COSl.6 The positive cost of policing land consumption of
follow clansmen reduces the value to an investor of his investments
in land.7 Also, as Johnson has shown, the discou nt rate used in
discounting future income streams is higber when property rights are not
clearly defined due to a risk premium. He said, "if at the optimal
level of search owners are still not known with certainty there is a
residual uncertainty that someone not a party to contract of sale, lease,
rent or permission for investment, etc., may emerge with an ownership
right in the Jar.d. Thus the risk premium added to the rate used for
discounting income streams will be higher the kss clearlY defined are
property rights.8
As such, investments that yield income streams in the near future
would not fall in value to the investor as those which yield income
streams further in tbe future for the higher the discount rate, the higher
the present value of short-lived income streams relative to long-lived
income streams.9
5 Hellener, G. K. : Peasant Agriculture Govt. and Economic Growth
in Nigeria Homewood, JIlinois. Rich. D. Irwin 19(6 p. 10. Also
Oluwasanmi, Agric. and Nigeria Economic Dev. Ibadan Ox. Univ. Press,
1966 pp. 52-53.
6 Omotude Johnson has dealt with the whole spectrum of allocative
difference consequent on communal tenure in both his dissertation and
a paper mentioned above.
7 If 0< is the proportion of his investment he can capture on the
land (assumed < 1). M E. P. C, the marginal effective policing cost
(assumed >0) and MV! the marginal value of investment in land under
individual tenure then aMVI-MEPC=marginal value of investment in
land to an individual under communal tenure, 1 hus «MVI
-MEPC) <MVI. See Omotunde Evan Johnson, "Economic Analysis
and the Structure of Land ...... "
8 Op. cit., Johnson, p. 262.
8 Ibid.
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Because of the lower degree of internalization prevalent in
communal systems as compared to an individual rights system, we would
expei:t that investments in and attached to land would be smaller within
the communal system. Instead, land c0Dsumption, the practice of
leaving a land less productive than one found it would be prevalent.
As Demsetz put it :
"An owner of a private property acts as broker whose wealth
depends on how well he takes into account the competing claims of the
present and the future. But, with communal rights, there is no broker
and the claims of the present generation is given an uneconomically
large weight in determining the intensity with which the land is worked.
Future generations might desire to pay present generations enough to
change the present intensijY of land usage. But they have no living
agents to place their claims on the market. Under a communal
property system, should a living person pay others to reduce the rate at
which they work the land, he would not gain anything of value for bis
efforts. Communal property means that future generations must speak
for themselves. No one bas estimated the costs of carrying out such a
conversation."lO
This seems a paradox since the communal system was intended for
preserving the rights of generations yet unborn to the use of land. It
happens, thus that the land the future generations would inherit under
this system is land devoid of much of its productive value.
The presence of uncertainty could work towards underutilization of
land. Since land is communally owned, all lands have potential
usufructuary rights exercisable on them. As the Elesi of Odogboly
~ as said, "I do not know of any uncultivated land that does Dot belong
to village."l1 But this potential right is not an effective right. The
insecurity of property rights combined with a high cost in terms of
punishment meted out to one found using land for which he bas no
legal entitlement would make it preferable for him to let the land lie
idle. In Nigeria, about 50% of the land is classified as unoccupied
wasteland.a
10 Demsetz, "Towards a Theory of Property Rights," An.erican
Economic ReVIew 1%7, p. 3'
1l Elesi of Odogbolu. West Ajlican Land's Committee Report,
\' 01. 1048.
12 See Sample Census of Agriculture, J950-51, and Anntlal Report
oj the Forest Administration, 19:>2-53.
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William Allan13 gave reasons for the presence of fragmentations in
traditional land tenure systems. Amogst these reasons was inheritance
rights, which results in sub-divisions in order to assure fairness in type
of land given to each in heritor. This could lead to a gradual
accumulation of fragments. The absence of land markets would
prevent consolidations as distant parcels are prevented from being sold
and adjoining territories purchased, assuming these lands are
homogeneous.
In Nigeria, farms range from less than one to several hundred
acres, but the majority of farmers do not work mori) than five to ten
acres 14 In most caiCS the farms do not consist of one compact piece
but of dispilrsed plots separated from one another by the land of others
or by bush fallow. Although a number of plots are within a mile
distance from the farmer's dwellings, there tre instances in which the
farmer had to walk from three to five miles to reach his farthest fields. 15
As a result, much expense of resources is incurred both in the tran~~
pert at ion of his equipment and in tbe policing of the activiti~s of family
labour and the actions of other farmers that advilrsely affect bis farms.
These costs \\ ould be reduced when the various plots are consolidated.
Further, the different modes of transferring land in the communal
system do not help matters. Inheritance rights have been shown to lead
to fragmer.tatioDs.16 Gifts, pledge, borrowing of land and leases all are
not perfect substitutes for sale and thus give allocativc effects which
work to lo">ver the value of the land in the demander's use. Since these
are short-term expedients they lead to Don-internalization of
externalities, as the scrap value of investmenh attained under their use
do not translate into the user's or demander's \\ ealth. They lead to
the same consequences as those analysed above. Leases When long~
term ~ ill gravitate to a wealth maximizing pattern of alienation from
society, s standpoint, and thus could be a substitute, though still not
perfect substitute, to sale.
13 William Allan, The African Husbandman, Oliver and Boyd, 1965,
p.380.
14 Ch. A. P. Takes, "Problems of Rural Dilv in Southern Nigeria,"
Nigerian Institute (,f Social Economic Research, Reprint series No 9
1965, p. 5. Also supplemented by my survey in Western Nigeria.
15 See Don N. Ike "Comparison of Communal, Freehold and
Leasehold Land Tenure; A preliminary study in. Ibadan an~ Ife,
Western Nigeria The American Journal of Economics ond SOCiology
Vol. 36, No.2 April 1977·
16 Loc. cit., William Allan.
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Thus an investigator \\ ould find that incomes of farmers (inco'TIe is
short-run proxy for Wealth) would b~ less than those attained un er
private property right system. Further, individual tenants (freeholders)
would tend to w rk harder given that the relative absenc of ext rnalities
would lead to a concentration of benefits and costs calling forth the
maximum effort of the farmers. 1 htre would also be a greater
efficiency of factor use as a result of the above. These \\ere explored
further in the authors survey of we tern NigeriaY
C. The Be efits aDd Costs of Individualization and Consolidatiol1.
The problems regardi g spe ificity of property rights with legal Rnd
tenure certainty, tIle int rnaJi7ation of benefits and costs via the c st-
reward structure, freedcm and legal enforcement of contrac:s are greatly
reduced with individualization which In olves the creation of individual
o\\ner I ip in gpecific allotmer.ts.18 Individualization would red ce the
constraints irn posed by custcm and tradition on e, pansion and/or
consolidation.
Individualization eliminates tile cost of negotiating long-term
contracts among intra-family land owners in order to raise the private
profitability of investments19
It also reduces the cost of polidng the activities of these intra-
family lardowners. Thus, it internaliz s most of the externalities present
in the erstwhile communal system. As such th~ value of land to he
landov\ner would incr(ase and the equilib ium level of investment
undertakell by the landowner would approach an efficient lev 1. Land
17 Don. N. Ike "Comparison of, Commu al····" Ioe. cit.
pp.191-11,5.
18 Individual ownershi illlplie, exdusivity of use and the rig11t to
alienate by sale or rental. With individual ownership there is pecificity
of propeny rights, further. the cost-r<:ward structure internalizes co~ts
and benefits since owner can realize the net values created in his land.
Also the right to transfer or alienate land is implied by individual
ownership. Individualization I ads to individual 0\ nership.
19 The modes of alienating land in communal syst lead to
lowered value of investments in land sill::e they are all short kr
expedien:s. Lon" term leases could be a substitut for sale, but there
are costs involved in making such long t"'rm contract' given the volume
or transactions necessary to realize th is with ind ivid ualizalion, tll is costs
is eliminated since there would no longer by a n-::ed to re~ rt to these
modes of transfer short of sale.
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consumption would be eliminated since the present and future values of
land affect the wealth positiox; of the landowner. Theile summarize the
benefits of individualization.
But individualization involves some costs These costs are; (a)
the ccsts of makfng contracts among the community members in order
to create indlvidual allotments, as well as (b) the costs of implementing
the terms of the contracts so negotiated. Also as Johnson noted20 there
are some nonpecuniary costs, the fact that the individualist is derided in
community as anti-social.
The benefits seem to be larger than the costs. The costs are one
psychological, the other real contractual. When land is abundant in
terms of population these costs would obviouslY be larger than the bene-
fits. As shONn earlier, the abundance of land removes land from the
premises of economic goods (zero marginal product of land) The
scarcity value of hnd must rise to a certain level before it becomes
profitable to contract for these rights. In the output on the production
function as a result of the authors survey of Western Nigeria the margi-
nal products of land over all tbe classification were all greater than
zero.21 Further, the marginal product-opportunity cost ratios are all
greater than one showing that land is scarce in the agricultural sector.
As such, land is no longer abundant and should be allocated like all
scarce factors in an open competitive market.
Why have the people persisted in their earlier mode of allocation
within the communal system instead of moving towards new benefit cost
possibilities as envisaged by Demsetz?
Demsetz and others assumed a world of zero transaction's cost. The
information trasmittal mechanism, the deus-ex-machina as it were W.as
assumed away in the literature. The persistence of cU'ltom, even
when economic conditions dictate change, show :that the inlormation
about the correct price vectors of different land p:ucels is made
inaccessible by the forces of tradition.
20 Op. cit., Johnson, "Economic Analysis and the Structure •...",
p.67.
21 We have evidence to the effect that not enough land is being
used in the agricultural sector by virtue of the high (greater than one)
marginal product-opportunity cost ratios for land.
See Don Mnaemeka Ike "Estimating Agricultural Production
H'unctions for some farm Families in Western Nigeria" The Developing
Economies Vol. XV No.1 March i977.
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The creation of land markets, it is argued, would reduce the cost
of obtaining information about th exchange value of land as well as
minimizing tbe costs of getting information about potential bl1yers and
sellers, But the ernel gence of land markets depends on the extent of
individualization, for withon t individualized allotments the cost of
negotiating a sale would be relatively bigh given the institutional restraint
to sale and the high (or large) v lume of ransactions necessary to
establish sale within tbe communal system.
As regards consolidation, there are obvious gains. In a hypothetical
world with homogeneous land, the gains are: (1') reduced transportation
costs of labor and equipment to and from d'lfer nt p:ircels of land;
(ii) reduce costs of policing t e activities of difTerent other farmers that
impinge on the value of the erstwhile scattered holdings as a result
reducing the cast of negotiating for the internalization of externalities;
(iii) reduced manager'al costs in 01 ed in supervising the active of those
employed (family or non-family) in the different land parcels,and (iJl) the
potentiality of benefiting from the economies of scale and tbe
nationalization of cultivation.
The costs involved are the costs of negotiating contracts for sale of
adjacent lands whic 1 woul be relatively high when property rights are
not yet defined with h:gal and ten ure certainty but t. ivial when such
rights have been defined, Thus the tendency towards consolidation is
obviat d by the absence of fe-simple rights on land. The high cost of
negotiating contracts when land is communally owned predicates the
p~rsistenceof fragmented holdings,
Conclusions
Nigerian system of land tenure is still communal and as such
constraints are in posed on optimal allocation of factors in the agricul~
tural sector with adverse consequences on the economic requisite for
wealth maximization in this sector· Land cannot easily be bought and
sold and efficient farmers do not thus have the opportunity to expand on
contiguous territory buying out less efficient farmers. TIM result is
fragmentation of holdings. The erminatioo of communal tet:lure by
accelerated individualization of holding and the emplacement of I od
markets to f~Kcilitate trading on agricultural lands' will lead to w~alth
increases in this sector of the Nigerian economy as shown in the paper.
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